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NOTES

INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION CONTROL: THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA-THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION
INTRODUCTION

The Great Lakes and their connecting waterways represent a valuable natural resource to both the United States and Canada.1 This resource could be destroyed if the governments of the United States and
Canada (the "governments") do not enact and enforce the legislation
necessary to curtail water pollution. Although the governments recognized their duty to refrain from polluting transboundary waters, such
as the Great Lakes (or the "Lakes"), in the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909,2 the two nations allowed industrial, municipal and recreational
wastes to contaminate the Lakes and render them a "sorry mess. '
In the 1970s, the poor condition of the Lakes finally prompted the
governments to act. This Note explores the role that the International
Joint Commission (the "I.J.C.") has played in rehabilitating the Great
Lakes and halting further pollution. Part I explores how and why the
governments created the I.J.C. Part II examines I.J.C. investigations of
pollution in the Great Lakes between 1909 and 1972. Part III looks at
the enactment of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1974'
1. "For centuries people have used the lakes for many purposes-drinking, boating,
swimming, fishing, shipping, industrial processing, and disposing of wastes. Millions of
Americans and Canadians now depend on the lakes for economic, recreational and aesthetic benefits." I.J.C., THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978 3 (1980).
2. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Great Britain, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 5481 [hereinafter
Boundary Waters Agreement].
3. Jordan, Great Lakes Pollution:A Framework for Action, 5 OTTAWA L. REv. 65, 65
(1971). The Great Lakes became polluted largely because of municipal and industrial

discharges of wastes into the Lakes. The rate of deterioration was accelerated by the
enrichment of the waters by nutrients, especially phosphorus. I.J.C., FINAL REPORT ON
POLLUTION IN LAKE ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST.

LAWRENCE RIVER 137, 140-41 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 REPORT].
4. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes
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and 1978.1 Part IV evaluates the effect the I.J.C. has had on the reduction of pollution in the Great Lakes, and Part V addresses what further steps can be taken to restore the Great Lakes and ensure that
they remain unpolluted.
PART I

A.

Background

The boundary between the United States and Canada' runs
through the middle of the Great Lakes.7 In 1903, due to concern over
the condition and uses of boundary waters, including the Great Lakes,
the two countries established the International Waterways Commission
("I.W.C." or the "Commission"),' which was to adjudicate the "conflicting rights which have arisen, or may hereafter arise, on streams of
an international character."9 The I.W.C. recommended, in 1906 and
1907, that the United States and Canadian governments "adopt principles of law governing uses of all international waters between Canada
and the United States"10 and create "an international body endowed
with authority to study and regulate the use of these waters."' 1 In August 1907, the I.W.C. drafted a treaty which eventually became the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.12

Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada, 23 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312
[hereinafter 1972 Agreement].
5. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes
Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257
[hereinafter 1978 Agreement].
6. The states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin border the Great Lakes on the United States side. The province of
Ontario borders the Lakes on the Canadian side. 1972 Agreement, supra note 4, art. 1(j),
23 U.S.T. at 303, T.I.A.S. No. 7312 at 3.
7. The Great Lakes are comprised of Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan, Ontario and
Superior.
8. See I.J.C., SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT ON WATER QUALITY 10 (1978) [hereinafter 1978
REPORT]. The I.W.C. was formed as a result of a Canadian resolution recommending to
the United States "the appointment of an international commission to act in conjunction
with the authorities of Mexico and Canada" in determining the respective countries'
rights in international waters. Id. The I.W.C. was officially disbanded in 1913. Id.
9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.

Boundary Waters Agreement, supra note 2.
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B.

The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909

The main purpose of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (the
"Treaty") was "to ensure the equitable sharing of boundary waters between Canada and the United States."' s Under the Treaty, the United
States and Canada agreed that each country had exclusive jurisdiction
and control over the use and diversion of all waters on its own side of
the boundary which in their natural channels would flow across the
boundary or into boundary waters.' Any interference with or diversion
from their natural channel of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in injury to the other country, gave rise to the same legal
rights and remedies as if the injury took place in the country where the
diversion or interference occurred.'
Water pollution was not a prevalent social concern when the governments enacted the Treaty." Nevertheless, the two countries could
not agree on how to address the issue. During the negotiation of the
Treaty, Canadian representatives sought to introduce a provision "forbidding water pollution having transboundary consequences"'" and
tried to establish a joint administrative agency vested with the necessary police powers to enforce the provision.'" The Secretary of State of
the United States objected, stating that the strongest provision he
would agree to was "an anti-pollution clause covering boundary and
transboundary waters over which the joint agency would have no jurisdiction."' 9 The two countries finally agreed, in Article IV of the Treaty,
that "boundary waters or waters flowing across the boundary shall not
be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the
other." While the United States still objected to even this provision, on
13. Jordan, supra note 3, at 66.
14. Boundary Waters Agreement, supra note 2, art. II, 36 Stat. at 2449, T.S. No. 5481
at 14. The preliminary article in this agreement defines boundary waters as
the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting
waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the international boundary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays,
arms and inlets thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their natural channels would flow into such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or waters flowing
from such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or the waters of rivers flowing across the
boundary.
Id. 36 Stat. at 2448-49, T.S. No. 5481 at 13. Boundary waters other than the Great Lakes
include the St. Croix River, between Maine and New Brunswick, and the Okanagan,
Osoyoos, and Skagit Rivers, between Washington and British Columbia.
15. Id.
16. Jordan, supra note 3, at 67.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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the grounds that it was "a clear attempt to create a police power at the
federal and international levels over water pollution,"20 Canada insisted that the clause be included in the Treaty, assuring the United
States that "the rule would be enforced only in more serious cases.""
Article VII of the treaty created the International Joint Commission (the "I.J.C."), composed of three members from the United States
and three from Canada,2 2 which would act as an impartial "watchdog"
over the boundary waters. Articles III and IV vested the I.J.C. with
jurisdiction over certain cases involving uses, obstructions or diversions
of boundary waters. Furthermore, under Article IX, each government,
on its own initiative or collectively,2 s could ask the I.J.C. to examine
and report on any other questions or matters of difference arising between the United States and Canada involving the rights, obligations
or interests of either in relation to the other, or the inhabitants of the
other, along the common frontier.
The I.J.C.'s authority to hear cases involving water pollution is derived from Article IX in conjunction with the prohibition on pollution
of boundary waters contained in Article IV.24 Significantly, however,
the I.J.C.'s findings regarding cases referred to the I.J.C. under Article
IX "shall not be regarded as decisions of the questions or matters so
submitted either on the facts or the law and shall in no way have the
character of an arbitral award" (emphasis added). Thus, in these
cases, the I.J.C. functions in an advisory manner only. While Article X
of the Treaty provides that the governments may consent to refer such
questions to the I.J.C. for binding decision, the governments have not
referred any question to the agency for binding decision in the I.J.C.'s
eight-year history.
20. Id. at 67-68.
21. Id. at 68.
22. Boundary Waters Agreement, supra note 2, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451, T.S. No.
5481 at 16.
23. Id. art. IX, 36 Stat. at 2452, T.S. No. 5481 at 17.
24. Art. IX of the Boundary Waters Agreement provides:
[Any other questions or matters of difference arising between [the parties] involving the rights, obligations or interests of either in relation to the other or to
the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier' between the United
States and the Dominion of Canada, shall be referred from time to time to the
International Joint Commission for examination and report, whenever either the
Government of the United States or the Government of the Dominion of Canada
shall request that such questions or matters of difference be so referred.
Id.
25.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 10

SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BETWEEN

(1979) [hereinafter A.B.A.].

INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION CONTROL

19881

PART II

A.

InternationalJoint Commission Reports, 1909-1972

Although the United States and Canada sent thirty-six references
to the I.J.C. between 1909 and 1972, only three of these dealt with
water pollution in the Great Lakes. The first such reference came in
1912, ss when the United States and Canada, concerned about an outbreak of typhoid fever, asked the I.J.C. to determine "[tlo what extent
and by what causes and in what localities have the boundary waters
between the United States and Canada been polluted so as to be inju' s7
rious to the public health and unfit for domestic and other uses?
The I.J.C. report, issued in 1918,28 described the situation in parts of
the Great Lakes as "generally chaotic, everywhere perilous and in some
cases disgraceful."2 9 The I.J.C. told the governments that "it was both
feasible and practicable to remedy the existing situation and to prevent future pollution,"8 0 and asked for the authority "to make such
rules, regulations, directions, and orders as in its judgment may be
deemed necessary" to curtail pollution in boundary and transboundary
waters."' The I.J.C. believed that without such power, it would be unable to resolve possible conflicts between national, state, provincial and
local authorities.32 The governments agreed to give the I.J.C. this
power and asked the I.J.C. to draft a proposal to that effect. The I.J.C.
drafted a convention giving itself the power to initiate investigations
and determinations of pollution sources, and obliging the governments
"to enact legislation whereby enforcement measures could be taken.""3
Significantly, the I.J.C. did not seek enforcement power for itself.3 4
Nevertheless, despite the governments' approval of the original re26.

I.J.C. Files, Docket No. 4 (1912).
I.J.C., FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ON THE POLLUTION
OF BOUNDARY WATERS REFERENCE 5 (1918) [hereinafter 1918 REPORT].
28. See generally id.
29. 1978 REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. In its 1918 Report, the I.J.C. stated:
[T]he present international situation is not the result of any desire on the part
of the inhabitants of either country to ignore international obligations either of
comity or of law, but is the outcome of the failure on the part of the urban
communities in each country, respectively, to recognize from a sanitary standpoint any right in other communities to river waters, especially communities on
their own side of the boundary line.
1918 REPORT, supra note 27, at 48.
30. Jordan, supra note 3, at 68.
31. 1918 REPORT, supra note 27, at 50.
27.

32. Id.
33.

Jordan, supra note 3, at 69.

34. Id.

N.Y.L.
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quest, the convention was never concluded,3 5 and the two nations did
not give the I.J.C. "further direction or authority with respect to pollution of" boundary waters."'
The I.J.C. considered its second Great Lakes pollution question in
1946,11 when the United States and Canada asked the I.J.C. to investigate pollution in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair and the Detroit
River."s The governments believed the pollution resulted from "new
types and greater volumes of wastes discharges [sic] by developing industrial complexes and accompanying growth and concentrations of
population."3 9 On May 15, 1946, the I.J.C. appointed a board of technical advisers composed of eight members: two each from the United
States Public Health Service, the Department of Health and Welfare
of Canada, the State of Michigan and the Ontario Department of
Health. 40 On October 2, 1946, the governments expanded the reference
to include the St. Mary's River.4 On April 2, 1948, the governments
expanded the reference again to include a study of pollution in the
Niagara River. 42 The original advisory board adopted the study of pollution in the St. Mary's River, while the I.J.C. created a second board
to investigate conditions in the Niagara River.43 Between 1946 and
1949, these boards supervised comprehensive surveys of the principal
sources of pollution in these boundary waters and tributaries. Each
agency represented on the advisory boards provided staff members to
conduct the field work.
The I.J.C. incorporated the advisory boards' reports into its 1950
report" and concluded that the waters under study were being pol35. The convention was not concluded for several reasons. First, the governments believed that the water supply was inexhaustible. Second, the chlorination of municipal
water supplies was commenced. Finally, "expenditures of large sums of money on waste
treatment facilities did not appear to be urgent." 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
36. Id.
37. I.J.C. Files, Docket No. 54 (1946); see also I.J.C., SAFEGUARDING BOUNDARY WATER
QUALITY:

A

COOPERATIVE EFFORT BETWEEN THE UNITED. STATES AND CANADA UNDER AN

16 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 REPORT].
38. These bodies of water, together with the St. Mary's River and the Niagara River,
make up the Connecting Channels of the Great Lakes. See 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at
3.
39. Id.
40. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 37, at 17.
41. Id. at 16-17.
42. Id.
43. Id. Pollution in both the Niagara and the St. Mary's Rivers was thought to be
caused by the same problems causing pollution in the waters in the original reference,
namely, greater waste discharges due to industrialization and population growth. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
INTERNATIONAL TREATY

44.

I.J.C., REPORT

OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, UNITED STATES AND CAN-
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luted in violation of Article IV of the Treaty."" The I.J.C. determined
that the major causes of pollution were "inadequately treated domestic
sewage which created a bacteriological content in the waters three to
four times greater than that reported in the 1912 study""' and industrial wastes. To combat pollution, the I.J.C. promulgated specific water
quality objectives meant to "restore and maintain the waters of the
Connecting Channels in a condition that would not impair the many
uses desired of them.'

7

Also, in a bid for the powers it had been de-

nied in 1918, the I.J.C. recommended that the United States and Canada authorize the I.J.C. to "establish and maintain continuing supervision over boundary waters pollution through boards of control
appointed by"" the I.J.C. The governments approved all of the I.J.C.'s
recommendations, including expansion of its power, and incorporated
the objectives into their pollution abatement programs.' Unfortunately, neither country made a significant effort to meet the objectives; 50 thus, even though the I.J.C. acquired greater supervisory power,
pollution in the Great Lakes continued.
The I.J.C.'s most influential assignment, in terms of its effect upon
the governments' attitude toward pollution in the Great Lakes, came
in 1964, when the United States and Canada asked the Commission to
conduct an in-depth analysis of water quality in Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River. 1 The governments instructed the I.J.C. to focus its investigation on three specific questions. First, were the waters in question being polluted on
either side of the boundary to an extent which was causing or likely to
cause injury to health or property on the other side? 2 Second, if such
pollution was occurring, where was it occurring and what were the
causes? 3 Finally, if the waters were being polluted, what solutions
were most feasible, and how much would they cost?"'
(1950) [hereinafter 1950 REPORT].
45. Id. at 8.
46. Jordan, supra note 3, at 70.
47. 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
48. 1950 REPORT, supra note 44, at 9-10; see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying
text.
49. 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
50. In its 1970 Report, the I.J.C. stated that "the Commission's Water Quality Objectives are not being met currently in all reaches of the Connecting Channels because the
responsible authorities and industries have not provided sufficient treatment facilities to
keep pace with the population growth and with industrial expansion." Id.
51. I.J.C. Files, Docket No. 83 (1964); see also 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
52. 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
53. Id.
54. Id.
ADA, ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS

N.Y.L. SCH. J.
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On December 2, 1964, the I.J.C. created the International Lake
Erie Water Pollution Board and the International Lake Ontario-St.
Lawrence River Water Pollution Board (the "Boards") to undertake
the study.5 Senior government officials, scientists and engineers comprised the Boards. The I.J.C. asked the Boards to investigate the issues
raised by the reference, to review and incorporate "relevant information and technical data which had been or might be acquired by agencies in the two countries"5 6 and to advise the I.J.C. of their findings.
The Boards submitted ten semi-annual progress reports, maintaining close contact with the I.J.C. through correspondence and informal
meetings. The I.J.C., in turn, submitted three interim reports to the
governments, to keep them abreast of the status of the investigation.
The first interim report, in December of 1965,1" stated that the water
quality was deteriorating rapidly in Lake Erie and, to a lesser extent,
in Lake Ontario. The I.J.C. reported that enrichment of the water by
nutrients, especially phosphorus, caused the deterioration. It recommended that the governments act to "ensure sufficient purification of
all municipal and industrial wastes before discharge into these waters.
. . to achieve the maximum possible removal of phosphorus"" s and suggested that the two nations provide personnel and facilities to implement the recommendations effectively. The second interim report, issued in August of 1968, outlined the progress made by the Boards."
In 1969, following an oil spill off the coast of California, the governments asked the I.J.C. to report on the safety of underwater drilling
operations in Lake Erie." The governments also asked the I.J.C. to
investigate the effectiveness of methods used to clean up spills, and the
adequacy and feasibility of contingency plans to combat oil pollution
in Lake Erie.6 In addition, the I.J.C. suspected that mercury and
polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB") were causing pollution problems in
the Great Lakes, and directed the Boards to investigate these pollu55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 7, 25.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
Id.

59. Id. at 12. At the time of the second interim report, the boards were assembling
and evaluating data collected by United States and Canadian agencies. A brief outline
from the Boards regarding current and future pollution problems and then-current remedial programs of enforcement agencies on each side of the boundary was attached to
the I.J.C. Report. Id. at 12-13.
60. See Letter from Secretary of State for External Affairs for the Government of
Canada to the Canadian Section of the I.J.C. (Mar. 21, 1969); Letter from the Secretary
of State for the Government of the United States to the United States Section of the
I.J.C. (Mar. 21, 1969), reprinted in 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 163-64.
61. 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 163-64.
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tants."2 In its third interim report,6 3 the I.J.C. promulgated six recommendations regarding eutrophication s' and oil pollution, to be implemented immediately. The Boards subsequently submitted reports on
mercury and PCBs.
In September of 1969, the Boards sent a summary report on pollution in Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River to the
I.J.C." The I.J.C. released this report to the public on October 8, 1969.
In accordance with the I.J.C.'s Rules of Procedure," the I.J.C. notified
the public of hearings to be held concerning the Boards' findings. The
I.J.C. held hearings in Toronto, Ontario and Cleveland, Ohio concerning potential oil pollution. 7 In 1970, the I.J.C. held hearings regarding
the pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International Section
of the St. Lawrence River. The hearings were held in the following cities: Toledo, Ohio; London, Ontario; Hamilton, Ontario; Brockville, Ontario; and Rochester, New York." All interested parties had an opportunity to be heard and, as a result, approximately 180 witnesses
testified.6 After the hearings, the I.J.C. concluded that governmental
action was necessary to combat the urgent problems of oil pollution,
eutrophication and pollution from watercraft."0
In late 1970, the I.J.C. issued its final report on pollution in Lake
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id.
64. Eutrophication is a biological response to an increase in the quantity of nutrients
in a lake. Eutrophic lakes are rich in plant nutrients and have heavy growth of aquatic
vegetation. The deeper waters do not get sufficient oxygen because of the decomposition
of great quantities of organic material. The rate of eutrophication usually is extremely
slow. Putting large amounts of man-made nutrients into a lake, however, can, in a few
decades, produce eutrophic conditions which, under natural conditions, would take tens
of thousands of years to develop. The rate of eutrophication in the Great Lakes has
increased due to increased population, industrialization, agricultural practices, and the
use of phosphorus-based detergents. Id. at 35-36.
65. Id. at 9-10.
66. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, RULES OF PROCEDURE para. 23 (1964 revision)
[hereinafter I.J.C. RULES OF PROCEDURE].
67. 1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
68. Id.
69. At these hearings, representatives of each country, including officials at all levels
of government, made statements, as did representatives of industry and local organizations, and private individuals. Some of the witnesses included representatives from
Amerada Hess, Procter & Gamble Co., Lever Brothers Co., Colgate-Palmolive, Imperial
Oil Limited, Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., Du Pont of Canada Limited, the League of
Women Voters, Pollution Probe, Citizens for Clean Air and Water and the Academic
Council on Environmental Problems. In addition, a large number of housewives made
statements regarding phosphorus-free detergents; many secondary school and university
students also testified. Id. at 169-74.
70. Id. at 14.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 9

Erie, Lake Ontario, and the International Section of the St. Lawrence
River. 1 The report contained twenty-two recommendations, including
inter alia, suggestions that the governments adopt and implement the
Water Quality Objectives (the "Objectives") 71 set forth in Chapter XV

of the report, and that the states of Michigan, New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania and the province of Ontario recognize these Objectives as
minimum standards for water quality in their pollution control programs.7 3 In addition, the I.J.C. recommended that the United States
and Canada institute a program of phosphorus control, 4 develop programs to control the introduction of herbicides, pesticides and toxic
wastes into the Great Lakes;75 develop adequate waste treatment facilities; 78 review and amend, where necessary, laws dealing with disposal
of solid waste materials in the boundary waters,7 7 and improve methoil, hazardous or radioods for dealing with "major accidental spills of
78
active materials" in the Great Lakes System.
71. 1970 REPORT, supra note 3.
72. Id. at 149. The general objectives stated that the waters of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, the International Section of the St. Lawrence River and the Connecting Channels of
the Great Lakes should be:
(a) free from substances attributable to municipal, industrial or other discharges that will settle to form putrescent or otherwise objectionable sludge
deposits, or that will adversely affect aquatic life or waterfowl.
(b) free from floating debris, oil, scum and other floating materials attributable
to municipal, industrial or other discharges in amounts sufficient to be unsightly or deleterious.
(c) free from materials attributable to municipal, industrial or other discharges
producing colour, odour or other conditions in such a degree as to create a
nuisance.
(d) free from substances attributable to municipal, industrial or other discharges in concentrations that are toxic or harmful to human, animal or
aquatic life.
(e) free from nutrients derived from municipal, industrial and agricultural
sources in concentrations that create nuisance growths of aquatic weeds and
algae.
Id. at 144-45.
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id. at 150. A program of phosphorus control was implemented to reduce the
amount of phosphorus found in the waters to a level "necessary to prevent nuisance
growths of algae, weeds and slimes which are or may become injurious to any beneficial
water use." Id. at 147. The governments' specific goals were to eliminate phosphorus in
detergents by Dec. 31, 1972, to reduce the amount of phosphorus found in municipal and
industrial waste discharges by eighty percent by 1975, and to reduce the amount of phosphorus discharged into the waters from agricultural activities. Id. at 150.
75. Id. at 151.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 152.
78. Id. at 152-53.
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The I.J.C. asked the federal, state and provincial governments to
support its "water quality surveillance and monitoring programs for
those waters, including the inputs from their tributaries." 9 Again seeking to broaden the scope of its powers, the I.J.C. asked the United
States and Canada to give it
the authority, responsibility and means for coordination, surveillance, monitoring, implementation, reporting, making recommendations to governments ....
and such other duties related to preservation and improvement of the quality of the
boundary waters of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence systems as
may be agreed by the said Governments; the Commission to be
authorized to establish, in consultation with the Governments,
an international board or boards to assist it in carrying out
these duties and to delegate to said board or boards such authority and responsibility as the Commission may deem
appropriate.8 0
PART III
A.

The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978

Using the recommendations contained in the I.J.C.'s 1970 report
as guidelines, the United States and Canada (the "parties") drafted
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 197281 (the "1972 Agreement"). The Preamble to the Agreement stated that the two nations
were "seriously concerned about the grave deterioration of the water
quality" 82 of the Great Lakes, and that they were "reaffirming in a
spirit of friendship and cooperation" 3 their obligation under the 1909
Treaty to refrain from polluting boundary waters. The governments
believed that the best way to improve water quality was through "common objectives, the development and implementation of cooperative
programs and other measures, and the assignment of special responsi'
bilities and functions to the International Joint Commission." 84
Under the 1972 Agreement, the governments committed themselves to seeking the appropriation of funds and the enactment of any
79. Id. at 155.
80. Id. at 156.
81. 1972 Agreement, supra note 4.

82. Id. preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 302, T.I.A.S. No. 7312, at 2.
83. Id.

84. Id.
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additional legislation necessary to implement the Agreement 5 and to
seeking the cooperation of the state and provincial governments in implementing the Agreement.86 The parties agreed to use their best efforts to ensure that their water quality standards, and those of the
state and provincial governments, "would be consistent with the water
quality objectives" of the Agreement.8 7 In Article V of the Agreement,
the governments agreed to adopt programs to curtail pollution from
municipal sources, industrial sources, agricultural, forestry and other
land use activities, shipping activities, dredging activities, onshore and
offshore facilities and eutrophication. These programs were to be "either completed or in [the] process of implementation by December 31,
1975."88
The I.J.C. retained all of the powers given to it under the Boundary Waters Agreement or conferred upon it "by any legislation passed
pursuant thereto, including the power to conduct public hearings and
to compel the testimony of witnesses and the production of documents." 89 In addition, the 1972 Agreement granted the I.J.C. the responsibility of collating, analyzing and disseminating data and information from the parties and the state and provincial governments
relating to water quality in the Great Lakes, information concerning
the water quality objectives and the effectiveness of programs and
other measures implemented pursuant to the Agreement.8 The Agreement also charged the I.J.C. with tendering advice and recommendations to the parties and the state, provincial and local governments
about problems regarding water quality,91 investigating any water quality problems the parties might refer to it 92 and assisting in the coordination of research. 3 Finally, Article VII of the 1972 Agreement mandated the creation of two boards, the Great Lakes Water Quality
Board 4 and the Research Advisory Board,95 to assist the I.J.C. in carrying out its duties.
In the 1972 Agreement, the governments required the I.J.C. to report to the governments annually and permitted it to issue special re85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. art. X, para. 2(a)-(b).
Id. art. X, para. 2(c).
Id. art. IV.
Id. art. V, para. 1.
Id. art. VI, para. 2.
Id. art. VI, para. 1(a)-(b).
Id. art. VI, para. 1(c).
Id. art. VI, para. 1(f).
Id. art. VI, para. 1(e).
Id. art. VII, para. 1.
Id.
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ports if special problems arose." The governments also directed the
I.J.C. to submit yearly budgets of anticipated expenses. 97 Because the
two nations failed to vest the I.J.C. with enforcement powers, however,
the ability to prevent pollution and remedy existing conditions remained with the United States and Canadian governments.
Despite the good intentions apparent in the 1972 Agreement, the
governments encountered difficulty in implementing it." In its 1976 report, the I.J.C. told the governments that progress in cleaning up the
Great Lakes was "generally slow, uneven and in certain cases disappointing." 9 The I.J.C. said, "Canada and the United States must accelerate efforts to control municipal pollution or the Great Lakes will
not meet the water quality objectives even by the end of the century."' 00 The I.J.C. submitted new, more stringent objectives to the
public in December of 1976, and proposed these new objectives to the
government in 1977. It asked the governments to expend sixteen million dollars over a ten-year period on the Great Lakes Surveillance
Program, with sixty percent of the cost to be borne by the United
States and forty percent by Canada.' 0 '
On November 22, 1978, in light of the shortcomings of the 1972
Agreement, the governments signed the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1978102 (1978 Agreement). This agreement "called for increased efforts and tougher goals for the clean-up of the Great
Lakes."' 0 3 In the Preamble to the 1978 Agreement, the governments
stated that they had "decided that the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of April 15, 1972, and subsequent reports of the International Joint Commission provide a sound basis for new and more effective cooperative actions to restore and enhance water quality in the
Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." ' 4 The 1978 Agreement was more comprehensive than its predecessor in that the governments recognized the
problems posed by the discharge of toxic substances into the Great
96. Id. art. VI, para. 3.
97. Id. art. VII, para. 2.
98. "[A]Ithough public surveys show that those who use the Great Lakes see overall
improvements in water quality," the I.J.C. remained concerned "about the critical problem of toxic substances, concentrations of phosphorus and heavy metals and the disposal
of hazardous industrial wastes." 1978 REPORT, supra note 8, at 22.
99. I.J.C., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON WATER QUALITY 15 (1976) [hereinafter 1976
REPORT].

100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 16.
1978 Agreement, supra note 5.
103. 1978 REPORT, supra note 8, at 21.
104. 1978 Agreement, supra note 5, preamble, 30 U.S.T. at 1384, T.I.A.S. No. 9257, at
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Lakes ' 5 and expanded their roster of pollution programs to include an
inventory of pollution abatement requirements,10 s control of persistent
toxic substances 07 and identification and control of sources of airborne
pollutants.108 The governments also implemented "a coordinated surveillance and monitoring program in the Great Lakes System . . . to
assess compliance with pollution control requirements and achievement of the Objectives, to provide information for measuring local and
whole lake response to control measures and to identify emerging
problems."10 9 This agreement required the I.J.C. to report to the governments biennially, rather than annually,1 10 and established two permanent advisory boards-the Great Lakes Water Quality Board"' and
the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board"-to assist the I.J.C. in carrying out its responsibilities. Finally, the 1978 Agreement established
the I.J.C.'s Great Lakes Regional Office' to provide administrative
support and furnish "a public information service for the programs,
including public hearings, undertaken by the International Joint Commission and by the Boards,"" " with the Director of the office assuming
5
responsibility for preparation of the I.J.C.'s annual budget.'

PART IV

A.

The Effect of the I.J.C. on the Reduction of Pollution in the
Great Lakes

While the I.J.C. lacks the authority to render decisions on pollution issues," 6 it has played a vital role in curtailing pollution in the
Great Lakes by investigating pollution problems and suggesting potential solutions to the governments. When the I.J.C. receives a reference
from the governments under Article IX, it assigns the reference to one
or more joint Technical or Advisory Boards (the "Boards") as pre105. 1978 Agreement, supra note 5.
106. Id. art. VI, para. 1(c).
107. Id. art. VI, para. 1(k).
108. Id. art. VI, para. 1(1).
109. Id. art. VI, para. 1(m).
110. Id. art. VI, para. 3.
111. Id. art. VII, para. 1(a).
112. Id. art. VIII, para. 1(b).
113. Id. art. VIII, para. 3.
114. Id.
115. Id. Terms of Reference for the Joint Institutions and the Great Lakes Regional
Office para. 3(h).
116. See Boundary Waters Agreement, supra note 2, art. IX, 36 Stat. at 2452, T.S.
No. 5481 at 17.
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scribed by the I.J.C. Rules of procedure.'"" These Boards attempt to
reach an agreement on the issue's technical merits, drawing heavily on
existing governmental departments, 18 and present their findings to the
I.J.C., which in turn reports to the governments. The governments
have accepted the I.J.C.'s recommendations in eighty percent of the
referred disputes.'1 9
The problem lies, however, in the scope of the I.J.C.'s authority.
The I.J.C.'s greatest shortcoming, inherent in its creation under the
Boundary Waters Agreement, is its inability to enforce its recommendations. 2 ' This separation of advisory and enforcement powers hinders
the clean-up process, because the body with the greatest knowledge
about the problem-the I.J.C.-has its hands tied, while the bodies
with the power to act-the governments-lack a centralized view of
the problems. After the I.J.C. investigates a problem and recommends
solutions, the governments must act, which they have not always been
able, or willing, to do. This situation is further complicated because, as
executive agreements, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements are
not necessarily enforceable under United States law. 2 ' The Constitution of the United States requires legislation to be enacted by the Congress. To the extent, however, that the agreements are consistent with
the Clean Water Act, 22 the Toxic Substances Control Act' and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,' 2 ' the agreements are enforceable as administrative implementations of those statutes. 12 5 In
Canada, where the federal government has a broader rule-making
been reinforced by inpower,' 2 the provisions of the agreements have
27
corporation in federal-provincial agreements.
Two basic jurisdictional dilemmas have also complicated the
I.J.C.'s efforts to control pollution in the Great Lakes. The first problem arises because a large number of political units have an interest in
the Lakes. Geographically, the Great Lakes lie not only within the borders of the United States and Canada, but also within the borders of
the states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Penn117.
118.
119.

RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 65, para. 28(1).
A-B.A., supra note 25, at 28.
Id.

I.J.C.

120. See supra text accompanying notes 11-24; see also Jordan, supra note 3, at 69.
121. Sugarman, Controlling Toxics on the Great Lakes: United States-Canadian
Toxic Problems Control Program, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 299, 306 (1985).
122.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).

123.

15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2626 (1982).

124.

16 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3473 (1982).

125. Sugarman, supra note 121, at 306.
126. Id.
127. Id.

N.Y.L.
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sylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin and the province of Ontario. 28 Each of these
entities has its own laws on pollution governing the portions of the
Lakes which lie within its territory. 129 Each jurisdiction also has its
own agencies responsible for administering and enforcing its laws.
The 1964 reference to the I.J.C. regarding the lower Great Lakes
region is a good example of this jurisdictional dilemma. Because seven
different entities were prescribing rules in this region when the reference was made, neither the objectives nor the enforcement of the laws
were consistent; 3 0 in some cases, the laws of the separate jurisdictions
This inconsistency presented a serious
were actually incompatible.'
obstacle to an effective pollution prevention program. For example,
commercial vessels and pleasure craft could travel freely across the international and state boundaries of the Great Lakes. Yet, no uniform
law existed regarding the control of waste from the craft;1 2 in 1969, no
single law or regulation in the United States or Canada dealt with all
aspects of water pollution by watercraft. 3 3 In addition, many of the
laws in effect were tokens because enforcement was impractical."'3
Generally, the federal governments have regulated navigation and
shipping in the Great Lakes.' 35 Fisheries on the Lakes have been regulated at the federal level in Canada, but at the state level in the United
States. 36 Municipal, industrial and agricultural pollution, as well as
under the jurisdiction of
pollution from drilling operations, has 1been
37
state, provincial and local governments.
As pollution in the Lakes became more threatening, however, the
federal governments' involvement in the promulgation and enforcement of pollution laws grew. The United States enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Act,138 which provides that the states must submit
their water quality standards to the Environmental Protection Agency
for approval. This Act gave the United States government extensive
authority over water pollution.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See supra note 6.
1970 REPORT, supra note 3, at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

134. Id. By the time the I.J.C. submitted its 1970 report, it was informed that Ontario, Michigan and New York had enacted "satisfactory and compatible laws governing
the discharge of waste from pleasure craft." Id.
135. Id. at 108.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 108-09.

138. See supra note 122.
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Canada enacted the Canada Water Act, 39 which authorized the
creation of national-provincial water quality management agencies for
certain designated waters. These agencies may set water quality standards and implement programs to achieve those standards. If the provincial government does not cooperate, the federal government may
designate the waters, establish the agencies and water quality standards and implement the necessary standards itself.1 40
The second jurisdictional dilemma concerns the extent of the jurisdiction allotted to the I.J.C. by the governments, a point which has
always concerned the Commission.14 1 Several important issues arose in
1976. First, an exchange of letters'4 2 between the Commission and the
governments clarified the I.J.C.'s duty to notify both nations of any
problem that might arise, even though the problem was not encompassed by a reference.' "s The Boundary Waters Treaty did not provide
for formal notice and consultation by the United States and Canada;
neither country was required to consult with the other before proceeding with a project having potentially pollutant effects. Traditionally,
however, the I.J.C. had alerted the two countries about the transwere encountered in
boundary effects of a project when such matters
44
the normal course of the I.J.C.'s business.'
In February of 1976, the Commission proposed that, in addition to
informal notice, both governments should accept the principle that
projects on either side of the boundary having potentially harmful effects on water use or water quality "will not be planned or undertaken
without prior notice to and consultation with the other side."'"" The
I.J.C. would bring information to the attention of both governments to
encourage consultation. While the I.J.C. realized that each country, as
a sovereign,'" could act without consulting the other, it argued that
Canada Water Act, ch. 52, 1969-1970 Can. Stat. 1310.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 109.
141. See supra notes 31, 32, 48, 80, and accompanying text.
142. Letter from D.G. Chance, I.J.C. Secretary, to A.J. MacEachen, Secretary of
State for External Affairs, Canada (Feb. 13, 1976), reprinted in 1976 REPORT, supra note
99, at 41.
143. 1976 REPORT, supra note 99, at 39-43.
144. Letter from D.G. Chance to A.J. MacEachen (Feb. 13, 1976), reprinted in 1976
REPORT, supra note 98, at 39.
145. Id. at 40.
146. The unilateral attitude that each State enjoyed complete discretion over the use
of its territorial water evolved into a sense of joint responsibility for the boundary waters, as manifested in the 1972 and 1978 Agreements. Note, Restoring the Water Quality
of the Great Lakes: The Joint Commitment of Canada and the United States, 4 CAN.U.S. L.J. 208, 211 (1981).
139.

140. 1970
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modern principles of international law""' placed the needs of the sovereign in relation to its international obligations. The governments accepted this position. Allan J. MacEachen, Canadian Secretary of State
for External Affairs, wrote that both governments had accepted the
"desirability of prior notification and consultation in our bilateral relations."' 8 He also noted the importance of such consultation in mainthe meetings gave both sides a
taining bilateral relations, because
14 9
chance to air their concerns.
Second, a dispute arose involving the I.J.C.'s jurisdiction, absent
an application for approval, 50 over the St. Mary's Ice Boom Project.151
The Commission argued that in the absence of a special agreement between the parties, its responsibility was to determine whether a project
on one side of the boundary would materially affect the level or flow of
water in the other country. 152 I.J.C. Secretary D.G. Chance wrote,
"[tihe problems raised by this question are not new and remain of continuing importance to the role of the Commission on questions of jurisdiction."153 He noted that the I.J.C.'s concern about its right to interpret the scope of its jurisdiction was "a matter of long standing."' '
The Commission took the position that once the countries had created
the tribunal-in this case, the I.J.C.-and defined its powers, it was
the tribunal's duty to interpret the scope of those powers. Otherwise,
the legislatures could render the I.J.C.'s work "nugatory"' 5 by interpreting the I.J.C.'s jurisdiction in a manner contrary to the I.J.C.'s own
interpretation. The Commission concluded that it was empowered to
interpret the meaning of Article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty with
respect "to structures in aid of 'commerce and navigation' that do not
147. The modern doctrine of the international law of boundary waters is that of "equitable utilization," which says that "each state within an international drainage basin is
entitled to share in the beneficial uses of the waters." Id. at 212.
148. Letter from A.J. MacEachen to D.G. Chance (July 12, 1976), reprinted in 1976
REPORT, supra note 99, at 41-42.
149. Id. at 42.
150. See Boundary Waters Agreement, supra note 2, art. III, 36 Stat. at 2449-50, T.S.
No. 5481 at 14.
151. An ice boom consists of a series of floating timbers anchored to the bottom of a
river by steel cables. The ice boom helps prevent excessive flows of ice from damaging

downstream shore property and creating ice jams. I.J.C.,

EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON
WATER QuALITy 22 (1980). While the St. Mary's Ice Boom case did not involve a pollu-

tion issue, it is relevant insofar as it defines one aspect of the I.J.C.'s jurisdictional
powers.
152. Letter from D.G. Chance to A.J. MacEachen (Jan. 20, 1976), reprinted in 1976
REPORT,

153.
154.
155.

supra note 99, at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45.
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ally affect' levels and flows."' 56 Lacking this power, the I.J.C. would be
unable to prohibit unilateral action by one government despite the
Treaty's intention that the I.J.C. approve any action taken by either
side. ' 7
The governments disagreed with the I.J.C.'s interpretation of its
jurisdiction. The acting Under-Secretary for the Canadian Department
of External Affairs wrote that "[ilt is a well-established principle of
international law that no state may be subjected to the jurisdiction of
an international organization without its consent."' 8 He relied upon
the well-known principle that jurisdiction must always be set out
clearly in the instrument from which it is derived and cannot be presumed. 59 He noted that the Boundary Waters Treaty expressly reserved certain works from the I.J.C.'s jurisdiction,' 60 and that the governments in this instance had reserved their right to determine
unilaterally whether a work on one side of the boundary would materially affect levels and flows on the other. The Under-Secretary concluded that while materiality was not precisely defined,"" the parties
had carefully studied the effects of the Boom before concluding that
there would be no material transboundary impact. Thus, there had
been no unilateral determination of materiality.' 62
PART V
Conclusions
The I.J.C. has been called a "weak institution in terms of formal
powers in the area of pollution control,"' 63 because "[iut lacks the right
to initiate its own investigations and depends upon the governments to
submit references to it."'" While the I.J.C. is a reactive agency, acting
only upon the summons of the two nations, it nevertheless has played
an important role in the rehabilitation of the Great Lakes. The I.J.C.'s
main contributions to the improvement of water quality have been
fact-finding, which "is itself a contribution to mutual understand156.

157.
158.
in 1976
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.

Id.
Letter from Acting Under-Secretary to D.G. Chance (July 20, 1976), reprinted
REPORT, supra note 99, at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
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ing,"5 and coordination of the governments' efforts. By acting as a
"clearing-house" for information and alerting both the governments
and the public to potential problems, the I.J.C. has made great strides
in communicating the urgency of the pollution problem and the options available for its solution. The IJ.C.'s inability to implement and
enforce its recommendations, however, continues to be a major hindrance to an efficient clean-up.
The governments must demonstrate their commitment to improving water quality in the Great Lakes by either implementing and enforcing the necessary legislation themselves, perhaps through another
treaty, or by delegating the necessary powers of implementation and
enforcement to the I.J.C. For example, the governments could amend
the Boundary Waters Treaty to make the I.J.C.'s decisions in pollution
cases binding on both parties. The I.J.C. has been successful in identifying pollution problems and suggesting solutions to these problems;
thus, it has exercised its role in cleaning up the Great Lakes to the
fullest extent possible under its current authority. As noted above,"'6
once the I.J.C. makes its recommendations, the duty to implement
those recommendations lies with the governments. If the governments
cannot agree on how to combat pollution in the Great Lakes they
should at least agree to entrust the matter to a competent, impartial
third party."'1 Any loss of autonomy experienced by the governments
would be justified by the end result-improved water quality in the
Great Lakes.
Jennifer Woodward

165. A.B.A., supra note 25, at 18.
166. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
167. "Over the years there has been striking evidence of the Commission's attachment to this basic philosophy of impartiality. In only three of more than 100 cases with
which the Commission has dealt have the Commissioners divided on national lines or
failed to reach agreement." 1978 REPORT, supra note 8, at 11.

